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Abstract 
The Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) paradigm was devised to test predictions 
that cognitive biases have a causal influence on emotional status. Increasingly, 
however, researchers are testing the potential clinical applications of CBM. While 
generally successful in reducing emotional vulnerability in clinical populations, the 
impact of CBM interventions has been somewhat variable. The aim of the current 
experiment was to investigate whether social comparison processing might be an 
important moderator of CBM. Healthy participants were presented with 80 valenced 
scenarios devised to induce a positive or negative interpretative bias. Critically, 
participants answered a series of questions designed to establish whether they 
assimilated or contrasted themselves with the valenced descriptions.  The induction 
of an interpretation bias that was congruent with the valence of the training scenarios 
was successful only for participants who tended to assimilate the valenced scenarios, 
and not for those participants who tended to evaluate themselves against the 
scenarios. Furthermore, the predicted influence of CBM on emotional outcomes 
occurred only for those who had an assimilative rather than evaluative orientation 
towards CBM training material. Of key importance, results indicated that “evaluators” 
showed increased emotional vulnerability following positive CBM training.  This 
result has both theoretical and clinical implications in suggesting that the success of 
CBM is dependent upon the way in which participants socially compare themselves to 
CBM training material.  
 
Key words: cognitive bias modification, social comparison, interpretation bias, 
emotional vulnerability  
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The Influence of Social Comparison on Cognitive Bias Modification and Emotional 
Vulnerability 
 Cognitive models of psychopathology predict that information processing 
biases have a causal influence on affective experience (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1988; Williams, Watts, Macleod & Mathews, 1988, 1997). 
Thus, persistent selective negative biases in attention, interpretation and memory are 
thought to induce higher levels of emotional vulnerability. The Cognitive Bias 
Modification (CBM) paradigm was devised to specifically explore this predicted 
causal relationship between selective processing biases and emotional vulnerability. 
The idea is that by inducing either a positive or a negative bias in information 
processing we can assess the consequent impact on emotional vulnerability. Many 
CBM studies have supported such models by showing - within a laboratory setting - 
that inducing a positive or a negative interpretation bias has a congruent influence on 
mood and emotional vulnerability (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Koster, MacLeod & Fox, 
2009, Macleod & Mathews, 2012; Mathews & Hertel, 2011, for reviews).  
Given that maladaptive processing biases are thought to play a role in the 
aetiology as well as the maintenance of anxiety and depression disorders, the clinical 
potential of CBM interventions has not gone unnoticed. On the basis of this 
scientifically endorsed causal relationship between selective processing and emotional 
status, CBM is currently being developed as a potential supplement to psychological 
(Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence & Mackintosh, 2011) 
as well as pharmacological (Browning , Grol, Ly, Goodwin, Holmes, & Harmer, 
2011) interventions for anxiety and depression. The central idea is that CBM can 
retrain maladaptive processing biases so that they are normalized with consequent 
benefits to mental health. To take CBM outside the controlled laboratory setting into a 
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wider more variable clinical environment, it is important to establish whether the 
relationship between selective processing and emotional status is as discrete as CBM 
research has implicitly suggested. This is particularly important since a recent meta-
analysis has found that the effect sizes of CBM interventions on both biases, and 
especially on emotional status, are more modest than was originally thought (Hallion 
& Ruscio, 2011). 
In addition, a handful of CBM studies that attempted to modify biases in the 
interpretation of ambiguity have reported concurrent mood change and emotional 
vulnerability findings that run counter to the predictions made by theoretical models 
(e.g., Williams et al., 1988, 1997). Thus, exposure to positively valenced social 
training scenarios can result in a decrease in positive mood state during CBM training 
(e.g., Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008; Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & 
Mackintosh, 2006) and a decrease in emotional resilience after a stress task (e.g., 
Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Standage, Ashwin & Fox, 2009). These results 
highlight a need to investigate potential contraindications to CBM interventions prior 
to clinical application and developments outside of a laboratory setting. 
A possible explanation for such anomalous CBM findings comes from the 
social comparison literature. Social comparison research shows that we automatically 
make other-self comparisons that can be either assimilative (the comparison standard 
is absorbed into the self-concept) or contrasting (the comparison standard is used as a 
reference point to evaluate oneself against) (Markman & McMullen, 2003). Many 
factors are thought to influence which form of social comparison is adopted. 
Similarity/dissimilarity is one such influential factor and has been reported to 
engender a respective assimilative or evaluative orientation. To illustrate, Mussweiler 
(2001) primed first year undergraduate participants to look for similarities or 
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dissimilarities between themselves and a description of a target person (a second year 
student who had adjusted well to University life).  The similarity - primed group 
reported adjusting well to their own new University environment whereas the 
dissimilarity group reported difficulties in adjustment. Such empirical findings 
support a theory within the social comparison literature (Selective Accessibility 
Model, Mussweiler, 2001) that perceived similarity between the self and the 
comparison standard provokes assimilation of and identification with the 
characteristics of the standard, whereas perceived dissimilarity triggers an evaluative 
perspective between the self and the standard whereby difference and contrast are 
emphasized. For a review of social comparison research see Suls and Wheeler (2007).  
The very nature of CBM interpretation training forces participants to process 
exceptionally positive or negative social interpretations set by another individual that 
likely differ from their own natural thinking. This is particularly the case when 
positive interpretation training is presented to people with depression. The contrast 
from their normal processing style is likely to be salient and to elicit strong social 
comparison processes. Based on predictions from the Selective Accessibility Model a 
perceived dissimilarity between pre-written social scenarios and the participants’ own 
social experiences are perfect conditions to elicit an automatic social comparison with 
contrast effects (Mussweiler, 2001). This is exactly the case in scenario-based CBM 
studies that attempt to modify biases in the interpretation of ambiguity. For example 
with healthy samples negative CBM training is likely to elicit a downward contrast 
(‘‘my social life is more successful than the situations described in these scenarios’’) 
thus bolstering one’s subjective wellbeing. However, with positive CBM training the 
contrast will be upward resulting in a decrease in one’s subjective wellbeing and 
possibly engendering an increase in post-CBM negative mood and emotional 
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vulnerability. Thus, it is possible that CBM interpretation training might inadvertently 
induce social comparison processes that may explain some of the anomalous results in 
previous research. 
  In addition to situational factors, there are individual differences with regard 
to social comparison orientation (Gibbons & Bunnk, 1999) with personality traits 
such as neuroticism being positively associated with a tendency to evaluate the self 
against a comparison standard. For example, Van der Zee, Bunnk and Sanderman, 
(1998) presented recently diagnosed breast cancer patients with upward or downward 
comparison information about a woman who had been treated for breast cancer. 
Women scoring high on neuroticism demonstrated affective contrast with the upward 
comparison yet identification with the downward comparison relative to those low in 
neuroticism. Van der Zee et al. (1998) demonstrated that emotionally vulnerable 
people tend to adopt a comparison orientation that decreases rather than increases 
positive affect (i.e., assimilation of negative outcomes and contrast with positive 
outcomes). It is therefore possible that positive CBM training, which is likely to be of 
most use in clinical settings, might have an adverse effect on the very target 
population that it is designed to support. Therefore, the aim of the present study was 
to establish whether contrast effects operate within a typical CBM interpretation 
training intervention.  
The experiment employed a well-established scenario-based CBM 
interpretation training procedure. Participants were presented with positively and 
negatively valenced training scenarios and modification of interpretation style was 
indexed by assessing participants’ responses to new ambiguous scenarios (see 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Standage et al., 2009). Furthermore we assessed the 
influence that CBM has on emotional vulnerability (mood change as a function of 
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being exposed to a stressful situation). Emotional vulnerability was elicited by 
requesting participants to present a speech into a camera. In order to assess whether 
social comparison processing was occurring during CBM manipulations and creating 
a secondary influence, participants were asked a series of questions concerning how 
they compared themselves to the valenced training scenarios. These questions were 
designed to provide an index of 1) whether social comparison processing was present 
and 2) if present, whether social comparison processing influenced interpretation bias 
modification and emotional vulnerability.  
 Based on a considerable body of previous CBM research (Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011; Koster et al., 2009; Mathews & Hertel, 2011), it is expected that a CBM 
interpretation training intervention will a) successfully induce an interpretation bias 
congruent with the valence of the training, and b) have a congruent influence on 
emotional vulnerability. Based on models of social comparison processing (e.g., 
Mussweiler, 2001) we predict that the impact of CBM interpretation training will 
differ for those who have an assimilative rather than evaluative orientation. 
Specifically, participants who tend to evaluate themselves against the training 
scenarios are expected to demonstrate a valenced interpretative bias and emotional 
vulnerability effect counter to classic CBM prediction, whereas those who tend to 
assimilate the scenarios are expected to show effects congruent with the direction 
(positive or negative) of CBM training. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty two participants were recruited through advertising 
within the University of Essex. There was a gender distribution of 110 females and 42 
males. The age range was 18–64 years with a mean of 24.99 years. All participants 
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had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and no history of psychiatric 
illness.  
Apparatus 
The stimuli were presented to participants via booklets. A Sony Handicam 
DTR-TRV 900 E PAL was used for the ostensible purpose of recording speeches to 
be given by participants. 
Materials 
The CBM stimuli were based on those devised by Mathews and Mackintosh 
(2000), with some modifications. After publication of the 2000 paper, Mathews and 
Mackintosh refined their pool of CBM training scenarios by excluding the least 
effective scenarios and replacing them with new and improved scenarios. The present 
study used the updated pool of scenarios from Mathews and Mackintosh. 
Training Items. A training scenario consisted of 3 lines of text presented as 
one unified paragraph. The social descriptions were identical for both the positive and 
negative training conditions, except for the final word, which defined the valence of 
what was a previously emotionally ambiguous scenario. An example of a training 
item is as follows: 
‘‘Your partner asks you to go to an anniversary dinner that their company is holding. 
You have not met any of their work colleagues before. Getting ready to go, you think 
that the new people you will meet will find you friendly/boring’’ 
A comprehension question followed the training scenario and required a yes/no 
answer. For example, the comprehension question below corresponds to the scenario 
quoted above. 
‘‘Will you be liked by your new acquaintances?’’ Yes/No 
There were 2 practice training items and 80 training trials. The order of presentation 
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of the trials was the same for all participants. 
Test Items and Recognition Sentences. The test items consisted of a title 
followed by three lines of text with the final word preserving the ambiguity of the 
scenario. The comprehension questions that accompanied each test scenario were also 
neutrally toned. An example of a test scenario with its accompanying comprehension 
question is as follows: 
‘‘The Wedding Reception’’ 
‘‘Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception 
 You prepare some remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet. 
As you speak, you notice some people in the audience start to laugh’’ 
‘‘Did you stand up to speak?’’ Yes/No 
There were 2 recognition sentences pertaining to each test scenario, one positively 
valenced and one negatively valenced. Examples of the recognition sentences 
corresponding to the ‘‘Wedding Reception’’ test scenario are given below: 
“The Wedding Reception” 
“As you speak, people in the audience laugh appreciatively.” 
“As you speak, people in the audience find your efforts laughable.” 
For the response to the sentence recognition task, all participants were presented with 
four choices labeled as: ‘‘very different’’, ‘‘fairly different’’, ‘‘fairly similar’’ and 
‘‘very similar’’ which represented a 4-point scale ranging from 1 to 4 respectively. 
Participants used these four choice labels to compare the recognition sentences with 
the test items. There were 10 ambiguous test scenarios and therefore 20 recognition 
sentences in total. The order of presentation of the test scenarios and the recognition 
sentences was the same for all participants. 
Comparison Style Items. Six questions were devised to measure whether 
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participants assimilated the scenarios as part of their self-concept, or regarded the 
scenarios as a separate entity from which to form a self-evaluation. Participants 
responded to the questions by marking a 15cm horizontal line consisting of a 30-point 
scale with “1” representing “Not at all” and “30” representing “Completely.”  Two 
examples of comparison style items are as follows: 
Whilst reading the descriptions, to what extent did you feel the scenarios fitted with 
your idea of your social self? 
 
Not at all          Completely 
1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------30 
 
Whilst reading the descriptions, to what extent did you contrast the scenarios with 
your social self? 
 
Not at all          Completely 
1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------30 
 
Valenced Contrast Items. On the assumption that participants will use the 
scenarios as a reference point from which to draw a personal contrast, a further four 
questions were devised to index the valenced direction of the contrast (i.e., assessment 
of upward and downward comparison). As with the comparison style items, 
participants responded to the questions by marking a 15 cm horizontal line consisting 
of a 30-point scale with “1” representing “Not at all” and 30 representing 
“Completely.”  Two examples of valenced contrast items are as follows: 
“Whilst reading the descriptions, to what extent did you compare yourself to the 
scenarios in a self-devaluing way?” 
 
Not at all          Completely 
1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------30 
 
 
“Whilst reading the descriptions, to what extent did you compare yourself to the 
scenarios in a self-enhancing way?” 
 
Not at all          Completely 
1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------30 
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Visual Analogue Mood Scales. To monitor pre- and post-CBM mood and 
assess emotional vulnerability two visual analogue mood scales (VAMS) were 
presented at various points throughout the experiment to participants. As with 
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker (2002) each scale consisted of 
a 15 cm horizontal line with a 30-point scale. The terminal labels on one scale were 
relaxed and anxious and this was referred to as the anxiety scale. The terminal labels 
of the other scale were happy and depressed and this scale was referred to as the 
depression scale. Higher scores indicated a higher negative mood state. 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually and recorded their responses at a self-
paced rate directly into the booklet.  Participants first recorded their pre-CBM anxiety 
and depression using the two VAMS. Next participants were presented with two 
practice training items. A single instruction given was as follows: “Please read the 
following short descriptions of social scenarios. Try to imagine yourself as actually 
being in the social situation. Please answer the comprehension question at the end of 
each scenario.” Having read the scenario, participants completed the associated 
comprehension question by circling a “YES” or “NO” answer. Following the two 
practice training items, participants went on to complete 80 negative or positive 
training items depending upon group allocation. After this interpretation training, 
participants completed a post-training VAMS measure of depression and anxiety and 
then responded to the comparison style and valenced contrast items. Next 
interpretative bias was assessed by means of 10 ambiguous test items with the same 
procedure as the training items. After the test items, participants’ were instructed to 
complete the 20 recognition sentences by indicating on a four-point scale how similar 
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in meaning each sentence was to its corresponding test scenario. The final stage of the 
experiment concerned the elicitation of emotional vulnerability. Participants were 
informed of a requirement to give a 4-minute speech into a camera (“How socially 
successful you consider yourself to be, giving examples from your recent past to 
support your claims”) whilst the experimenter simultaneously set up a video camera 
in the room. Participants were reminded that they could leave the experiment at any 
time. They were told that they would be given 90 seconds to prepare the speech, but 
prior to preparing their speech they should record their levels of depression and 
anxiety using the VAMS. This final mood measurement provided under stress served 
as an index of emotional vulnerability. On completion of the third VAMS, 
participants were informed that the speech requirement was a ruse. Participants were 
fully debriefed. 
Results 
Data Treatment 
Similarity Ratings. Ratings of how similar the positive and negative 
recognition sentences were to the test scenarios served as the dependent measure for 
interpretation bias induction. Similarity ratings for the negative recognition sentences 
were subtracted from the similarity ratings for the positive recognition sentences to 
give a composite measure of interpretation bias with positive values indicating a 
positive bias, and negative values representing a negative bias and zero denoting 
neutrality.  
Comparison Style Ratings.  Items one, three and five measured the extent to 
which participants assimilated the training scenarios with higher ratings representing 
greater assimilation. Ratings for items two, four and six indexed the extent to which 
participants contrasted themselves to the training scenarios with higher ratings 
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denoting an increased tendency for evaluation and conversely a lower tendency for 
assimilation. Items two, four and six were reverse coded. All six items were assessed 
for internal consistency and exceeded the .70 criterion (Cronbach’s Alpha = .76). The 
ratings for the six items were averaged to make a single composite measure of 
comparison style with higher ratings representing an assimilation orientation and 
lower ratings representing a tendency to evaluate oneself against the scenarios.  
Valenced Contrast Ratings. Items one and four measured the extent in which 
participants reported making downward (“I’m better”) comparisons with the 
scenarios.  Ratings for items two and three indexed the extent to which participants 
made upward (“I’m worse”) comparisons and were reverse coded. All four items were 
assessed for internal consistency and exceeded the .70 convention (Cronbach’s Alpha 
= .86). The ratings for the four items were averaged to make a single composite 
dependent measure of valenced contrast with a higher rating representing a more 
positive contrast against the training scenarios. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Data was screened for multivariate outliers using Mahalanobis distances. 
These highlighted four outliers that were subsequently found not to represent extreme 
outliers for any singular variable but to have relatively high scores across a number of 
variables. These cases were not therefore excluded from the analysis but in order to 
ensure that findings were not vulnerable to these outliers all moderation effects were 
examined with and without these cases. No changes in the direction or significance of 
effects were found and therefore the results of analyses with all cases included are 
reported. Participants were randomly allocated to either a positive or negative CBM 
training group with the constraint of two equal sized groups. The two CBM groups 
did not differ on age, pre-CBM depression, pre-CBM anxiety (t’s < 1) or gender (χ2 
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< 1). Means, standard deviations, and the correlations between the study variables can 
be found in Table 1. None of the correlation coefﬁcients between variables exceeded 
.70, indicating that multicollinearity was not likely to be a problem. Further 
examination of the collinearity diagnostics associated with regression analyses 
indicated that all tolerance values were above .20, the value below which 
multicollinearity may be deemed to be problematic (Cohen, Cohen, & West, 2003; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Table 1 here 
Main Analyses 
Moderated regression was used to investigate comparison style as a potential 
moderator of CBM training effects. Regression analyses were conducted in line with 
the specific procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991) and predictor 
variables were standardised prior to analysis. Significant interactions were 
decomposed using simple slopes analysis (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) in order 
to examine the nature of CBM training effects at specified points along the 
comparison style ratings scale. This yielded regression coefficients for the effects of 
CBM training on interpretation bias, valenced contrast, and emotional vulnerability at 
low comparison style scores (i.e., evaluators) and high comparison style scores (i.e., 
assimilators). These conditional values of comparison style were specified as 1 SD 
above and below the comparison style mean.   
In order to examine whether CBM training induced an interpretation bias and 
whether this induced bias differed for those who assimilate or evaluate, a regression 
was conducted with interpretation bias as the criterion variable. CBM Group (Step 1), 
comparison style rating (Step 2), and the CBM Group by Comparison Style 
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interaction term (Step 3) were entered as predictor variables. In the first step CBM 
Group was a significant predictor (B = -.28, p = .001), with the positive group 
showing a positive bias following training relative to the negative group who showed 
a negative bias. The model accounted for 7% of the variance in interpretation bias 
(F(1,150) = 10.82, p = .001). The addition of Comparison Style in the second step 
resulted in a non-significant change in this variance accounted for (R2change = .001, 
Fchange = .24, p = .628) and Comparison Style was not found to be an independently 
significant predictor of interpretation bias (B = -.04 p = .628).  CBM Group remained 
the only significant predictor of bias in this step (B = -.29 p = .001, F(2,149) = 5.50, p 
= .005). The variables entered in the third step accounted for 18% of variance in bias 
induction, F(3, 148) = 10.58, p < .001. CBM Group remained a significant 
independent predictor (B = -.28, p = .001), providing further support for the initial 
hypothesis that CBM would be successful in inducing an interpretation bias that was 
congruent with training. Comparison style ratings remained a non-significant 
independent predictor (B = -.03, p = .758), however, the CBM Group by Comparison 
Style interaction term was found to be a significant independent predictor and its 
inclusion in the third step resulted in a significant increase in the variance accounted 
for (B = -.36, p < .001, R2change = .11, Fchange = 19.38, p < .001), indicating that induced 
interpretation bias differed according to Comparison Style and therefore across 
assimilators and evaluators. 
Simple slopes analysis indicated that the effect of CBM group on 
interpretation bias was non-significant for evaluators (B = .08 t(148) = 0.67, p = .507) 
and significant and negative for assimilators (B = -.64, t(148) = -5.59, p < .001). This 
indicates that, for assimilators, positive CBM training was associated with positive 
bias and negative CBM training was associated with negative bias. No significant 
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relationship was found between training and bias for evaluators at the conditional 
comparison style score of -1 SD. An interaction plot of these effects can be found in 
Figure 1. As the simple slope at the conditional value of low comparison style 
scores/evaluators (i.e., 1 SD below the mean) did not reach significance, the regions 
of significance associated with the simple slopes were examined. The examination of 
the regions of significance allows for the identification of the points along the 
comparison style scale at which significant slopes emerge. Regions of significance 
indicate that for evaluators, a significant and reversed relationship emerged between 
CBM training and bias at comparison style scores of 7.83 (B = .32, t(148) = 1.98, p 
=.050). Therefore, for evaluators with comparison style scores below 7.83, positive 
CBM training was associated with a negative interpretation bias.  
Figure 1 here 
To further substantiate the claim that valenced contrast effects due to an 
evaluative perspective are operating within the CBM procedure, a self-report measure 
of upward and downward comparisons was taken using the four valenced contrast 
items. If social comparison processes are present, then evaluators should report 
upwards contrasts with positive scenarios and downward contrasts with negative 
scenarios. This prediction was investigated via a regression in which valenced 
contrast was entered as the criterion variable and CBM Group (Step 1), comparison 
style rating (Step 2), and the CBM Group by Comparison Style interaction term (Step 
3) were entered as predictor variables. In the first step, CBM Group was a non-
significant predictor (B = -.11, p = .179, F(1,150) = 1.82, p = .179). The addition of 
Comparison Style in the second step also resulted in a non-significant model 
(F(2,149) = 1.57, p = .213). The addition of the CBM Group by Comparison Style 
interaction term in the third step resulted in a significant model (F(3,148) = 25.87, p < 
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.001) and accounted for 34% of the variance in valenced contrast. CBM Group and 
Comparison Style remained non-significant predictors (B = .08, p = .161 and B = -.07, 
p = .324, respectively). The CBM Group by Comparison Style interaction term was 
found to be a significant independent predictor (B = -.58, p < .001, R2change = .32, 
Fchange = 72.98, p < .001), indicating that valenced contrast differed across assimilators 
and evaluators in relation to the valence of CBM training. 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that the effect of CBM group on valenced 
contrast was significant and positive for evaluators (B = .68, t(148) = 7.02, p < .001) 
and significant and negative for assimilators (B = -.49, t(148) = 5.11, p < .001).  For 
evaluators, positive CBM training is associated with upwards contrast and negative 
CBM training is associated with downwards contrast, whereas the opposite holds for 
assimilators. An interaction plot of these effects can be found in Figure 2.  
Figure 2 here 
 Separate analyses examining moderation effects with regards to anxiety and 
depression revealed the same pattern of effects in each case. Anxiety and depression 
ratings were therefore collapsed into pre- and post-CBM mood ratings (first and 
second VAMS administrations) and emotional vulnerability (third VAMS 
administration). It was hypothesised that the effect of CBM on emotional 
vulnerability, controlling for pre- and post-CBM mood, would differ according to 
comparison style. This prediction was investigated via a regression in which 
emotional vulnerability was entered as the criterion variable and CBM Group, pre-
CBM mood, and post-CBM mood were entered in Step 1. Comparison style rating 
was entered as an additional predictor in Step 2 and the CBM Group by Comparison 
Style interaction term was entered as an additional predictor in Step 3. In the first 
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step, CBM Group and pre-CBM mood were non-significant predictors (B = .04, p = 
.575, and B = .04, p = .424, respectively) and post-CBM mood was found to be the 
only predictor of emotional vulnerability (B = .61, p < .001). This set of variables 
accounted for 39.7% of the variance in emotional vulnerability (F(3,148) = 32.48, p < 
.001). The addition of Comparison Style in the second step resulted in a non-
significant increase in this variance accounted for (R2change = .01, Fchange = 1.31, p = 
.254) and post-CBM mood remained the only significant predictor within the model 
(B = .64, p < .001, F(4,147) = 24.74, p < .001).  The addition of the CBM Group by 
Comparison Style interaction term in the third step resulted in a significant model 
(F(5,146) = 22.45, p < .001) and accounted for 44% of the variance in emotional 
vulnerability. CBM Group, pre-CBM mood and Comparison Style remained non-
significant predictors (B = .02, p = .771, B = .00, p = .976 and B = -.08, p = .220, 
respectively). Post-CBM mood remained a significant independent predictor (B = .61, 
p < .001) and the CBM Group by Comparison Style interaction term was also found 
to be a significant independent predictor (B = .19, p = .004, R2change = .03, Fchange = 
8.34, p = .004), indicating that emotional vulnerability differed across assimilators 
and evaluators in relation to the valence of CBM training. 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that the effect of CBM group on emotional 
vulnerability was borderline significant and negative for evaluators (B = -.17, t(146) = 
1.85, p = .067) and significant and positive for assimilators (B = .21, t(146) = 2.30, p 
= .023).  For evaluators, positive CBM training is associated with increased emotional 
vulnerability and negative CBM training is associated with decreased emotional 
vulnerability. In contrast, for assimilators, positive CBM training is associated with 
decreased emotional vulnerability and negative CBM training is associated with 
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increased emotional vulnerability. An interaction plot of these effects can be found in 
Figure 31.  
Figure 3 here 
Discussion 
  The results of the current experiment demonstrate the novel finding that a 
person’s comparison style when processing training material moderates the 
effectiveness of CBM on interpretation bias and emotional vulnerability. As 
predicted, the effects of CBM training were found to depend upon whether an 
individual engaged in assimilative or evaluative processing when reading the training 
scenarios. Specifically, for those who assimilated the scenarios, CBM was successful 
across both bias induction and emotional vulnerability. For those who evaluated 
themselves against the scenarios, bias induction was unsuccessful and moreover 
emotional vulnerability effects were in opposition to conventional CBM predictions. 
1 A moderated mediation analysis was conducted in order to investigate whether, in addition to the moderation effects investigated within the current paper, the effects of CBM on emotional vulnerability were mediated via interpretation bias. All moderated effects reported within the original moderated regression were still present and significant in this second analysis. However, interpretation bias was not found to serve as a mediator between CBM training and emotional vulnerability as the path between interpretation bias and emotional vulnerability failed to reach significance within the moderated mediation model. Attention to and interpretation of this finding was considered as outside the remit of the current paper. To interested readers, please contact the authors for further information. 
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This outcome is consistent with models of social comparison whereby perceived 
similarity or dissimilarity to a standard (e.g., scenarios) triggers an assimilative or 
evaluative stance enhancing comparability or contrast effects respectively (e.g., 
Mussweiler, 2001).  
For those who assumed an assimilative approach, positive CBM training 
consistently led to higher levels of positive interpretation and consequent emotional 
resilience. Similarly, for these assimilators negative CBM training led to lower levels 
of positive interpretation and subsequent lower emotional resilience. Thus, consistent 
with cognitive models of psychopathology (e.g., Williams et al., 1988, 1997) these 
results show cognitive biases to have a causal influence on levels of anxiety and 
depression. However, our results suggest a possible modification of this theory in that 
we found these effects only for people who assimilate the training scenarios.  
Our findings present a possible contraindication of positive CBM training that 
needs to be explored further given the unfavourable effects that emerged for 
individuals who assume an evaluative social processing approach. The moderated 
regression analysis clearly demonstrated that lower scores on the comparison style 
scale (evaluation focus) were significantly associated with a paradoxical effect of 
CBM training. For those who adopted an evaluative orientation, positive CBM 
training induced lower emotional resilience. That is, for these individuals, the positive 
CBM training resulted in increased levels of anxiety and depression in the face of 
stress. Conversely, negative CBM training was associated with a decrease in anxiety 
and depression vulnerability. With regard to bias induction and evaluative focus, 
CBM was ineffective. In addition, the region of significance analysis indicated that 
scores below 7.83 on the comparison style scale (7.77 points below the mean) would 
render the relationship between CBM training and bias induction as opposing. Thus 
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our results indicate a potential individual difference in social comparison processing 
that might have a strong impact on the effectiveness of CBM.  
 The above finding may go some way towards explaining the previous mixed 
results of CBM interventions on clinical outcome (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) and the 
counter-to-prediction post-CBM mood (Holmes et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2008) and 
emotional vulnerability results (Holmes et al., 2009; Standage et al., 2009) that have 
been reported in previous research. A preponderance of participants with an 
evaluative orientation in these studies may have produced the discrepant mood and 
emotional vulnerability effects. Moreover, the type of CBM paradigm may provoke or 
inhibit latent individual difference evaluative tendencies. 
It is clear that most published CBM research finds successful bias 
modification combined with congruent changes to emotion. For instance, Mackintosh, 
Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway and Cook (2006) reported an interpretative bias induction 
and subsequent emotional vulnerability change in line with CBM valence. 
Interestingly though, Mackintosh et al. used scenarios relating to physical health 
rather than social issues. The non-social theme of the scenarios may have failed to 
evoke social comparison processes. Beard and Amir (2008) induced a positive 
interpretation bias in high socially anxious participants and reported a consequent 
decrease in symptoms. However, Beard and Amir used the Word Sentence 
Association Paradigm (WSAP) rather than a scenario-based method. The participant’s 
task of deciding whether a single valenced word matches a single ambiguous sentence 
is more detached and less personal than reading/imaging social descriptions with 
one’s self as the central character. Therefore, as with Mackintosh et al. (2006), the 
alternative interpretative CBM methodology used by Beard and Amir (2008) may 
have precluded social comparison processes.  
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The same argument of impersonal training procedures preventing social 
comparison processes can be applied to successful interpretative CBM using 
homograph methodology (e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews 
& Rutherford, 2006) as well as successful attentional CBM training using the dot 
probe methodology (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002; Hakamata et al., 2010). Both 
homograph and dot probe methods of bias induction use single words or pictures as 
stimuli and require responses that are more dispassionate and less personally 
involving than scenario methodology. Thus there is some suggestion from the 
collective CBM literature that social comparison processing is only triggered when 
using the more personally engaging scenario-based CBM procedures. From a social 
psychological point of view, valenced stimuli such as single words or pictures provide 
sparse social information and therefore it would be both difficult and futile to use as a 
point of reference to draw an informative self-focused personal comparison. Lengthier 
descriptions of another’s private and personal thoughts and feelings in response to 
various social situations, provide a privileged insight and rich resource from which to 
draw personally meaningful comparisons with the aim of furthering one’s 
understanding of the self in relation to the social world. Thus the implicit motivation 
to engage in social comparison processing is more likely to be present in scenario-
based CBM than in other forms such as the dot probe, WSAP and homograph 
method.  
 Nonetheless, there remain a considerable number of social scenario-based 
CBM studies that have achieved successful interpretation bias induction and 
emotional change. For example, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway & Cook (2007) used 
four sessions of scenario-based CBM to induce a positive interpretation bias in high 
trait anxious individuals and reported a subsequent reduction in trait anxiety. 
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Mathews et al. also noted that for CBM to be effective, the level of positivity of the 
scenarios needed to be graduated so that the first scenarios presented to participants 
were not overly extreme and their potency increased slowly as the experiment 
progressed. This gradual increase in positivity will have softened the stark contrast 
and dissimilarity between the reference scenario and the self thereby encouraging a 
CBM compatible assimilative as opposed to evaluative stance. As such, the scenario-
based success reported by Mathews et al. is consistent with the underlying presence of 
social comparison processing within a CBM context.   
 Other examples of successful scenario-based research come from Hirsch, 
Mathews and Clark (2007) and Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith and Clark (2007). 
These studies used participants with high levels of anxiety. The social comparison 
literature would predict that individuals scoring high on measures of anxiety are likely 
to adopt a negative evaluative rather than positive assimilative focus (Gibbons & 
Bunnk, 1999; Van der Zee, Bunnk & Sanderman, 1998). Our CBM data go some way 
to supporting this prediction in that participants’ mood state when entering the 
experiment negatively correlated with valenced contrasts made against the scenarios 
irrespective of CBM group allocation [r(151) = -.350, p = .001]. In other words, the 
more depressed and anxious participants were, the less positive the contrasts that were 
made. Thus the results from Hirsch et al. (2007) and Murphy et al. (2007) are more 
difficult to reconcile with the current findings and those from the social comparison 
literature. A possibility is that comparison processing was occurring within the above 
studies, but the effects were not sufficiently strong to fully undermine the CBM 
influence.  
  Consistent with the argument that evaluative processing is an underlying 
contradictory presence within scenario-based CBM, are experiments that have 
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exposed sub-clinical or clinical participants to scenario training and not achieved full 
success. For example, Salemink, van den Hout and Kindt (2009) exposed high trait 
anxious individuals to multiple sessions of scenario training and achieved mixed 
results with participants improving on state and trait anxiety, but not on measures of 
social anxiety and emotional vulnerability. In addition, Blackwell and Holmes (2010) 
in a single case series presented seven participants diagnosed with major depression 
with scenario training. Only four of the seven participants reported positive benefits 
from the training. Of the three participants for whom CBM was ineffective, two 
reported being unable to use visual imagery when processing the scenarios as 
instructed. This imagery absence CBM failure is consistent with Holmes et al. (2009) 
who reported CBM success for participants who used visual imagery rather than 
verbal analysis to process scenarios. However, past scenario-based CBM success has 
been achieved without explicit use of imagery processing (e.g., Standage, Ashwin & 
Fox, 2010). A possibility is that scenario-based procedures that generally constrain 
participant activity, by for example instructing participants to visually imagine 
scenarios, complete word fragments or impose a time limit, may reduce the 
opportunity for evaluative processing. The current experiment’s methodology was 
self-paced with little cognitive load on participants other than to think about being in 
the social situation described. Thus it may be tightly constrained procedures rather 
than visual imagery per se that prevents evaluative processing. Blackwell and Holmes 
stressed the importance of identifying both the effective and failing components if 
CBM is to be taken from the laboratory to the clinic. The results of the current 
experiment suggest that evaluative processing is one potentially failing component 
within scenario-based CBM that may be enhanced or diminished by different 
Running head: COGNITIVE BIAS MODIFICATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON 25 
procedural paradigms. Its antagonistic effects can be overlooked if not explicitly 
tested for and may manifest in only partial CBM success. 
 A limitation to the current experiment is that the measure of comparison style 
was devised by the first author and has no proven psychometric properties as a trait 
measure of individual difference in social comparison processing. Furthermore 
comparison style was assessed after exposure to training material therefore, a 
possibility is that, training may have predicted comparison style rather than 
comparison style predicting response to training. A suggestion for future research is to 
assess social comparison orientation prospectively using a validated measure to see if 
individual difference on such a scale moderates the CBM outcome. A further 
limitation was that the stress task arguably lacked ecological validity and the 
measurement of emotional vulnerability was purely self-report lacking any 
behavioural and/or physiological correlates of stress.       
Clearly more research is necessary to elucidate the underlying mechanisms 
operating within CBM paradigms. The current study has provided strong evidence 
that a form of social comparison processing is evoked within a scenario-based CBM 
context and influences CBM outcomes, often to the detriment of the more emotionally 
vulnerable individuals. An argument has been put forward that evaluative processes 
are restricted to less constrained social scenario-based CBM and not present in 
homograph, WSAP or Dot Probe methodology. However, further experimental work 
is needed to test this argument as there have been reported CBM failures using both 
homograph and dot probe procedures (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs & Mathews, 2010 & 
Carlbring et al., 2012 respectively). 
A final point to make is that the contradictory CBM outcomes reported in the 
current study mirror findings within the emotion regulation literature, for example 
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paradoxical effects of emotional suppression have been reported (Dalgleish, Hauer, & 
Kuyken, 2008; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000) prompting a clinical movement towards 
acceptance techniques rather than suppression in dealing with unwanted emotion 
(e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2003; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2001). A goal of 
CBM research is to modify the manner in which individuals interpret ambiguous 
information in order to alleviate psychological distress. In this way CBM can be seen 
as another example of an emotion regulation strategy alongside existing techniques 
such as suppression, cognitive reappraisal, mindfulness, distraction etc. The emotion 
regulation literature is complex (Dunn, Billoti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009) and 
which strategy to advise a patient to adopt within clinical practice depends on 
numerous factors: the individual psychological characteristics of the patient 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2010), the nature of the disorder, the focus of the intended 
remediation (experiential, behavioural, physiological), the chosen time point within 
the emotion-generative process to address (Gross & John, 2003) etc. According to 
Rottenberg and Gross (2007, p325) there is “no one-size-fits-all solution” with 
different techniques only effective under specific circumstances. As such the 
mechanisms that contribute to CBM successes and failures, be it social comparison 
and/or a combination of other moderators, need to be more widely explored in the 
light of other relevant literatures. 
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Table 1. Means (standard deviations) and correlations between study variables a. 
 
Variables  Mean 
(SD) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  CBM groupb - -      
2. Comparison Style 15.60 
(4.67) 
-.21* -     
3.  Interpretation Bias 0.30 
(1.07) 
 
-.26** .02 -    
4.  Valenced Contrast 17.22  
(6.39) 
.11 -.11 .42** -   
5.  Pre-CBM Mood 9.32 
(5.63) 
-.03 .00 -.23** -.28** -  
6. Post-CBM Mood 10.85    
(6.14) 
.09 .21** -.30** -.32** .68** - 
7. Emotional Vulnerability 16.37       
(6.97)                                   
-.02 -.05 -.29** -.37** .45** .63** 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .001  
a higher values =  more assimilative comparison style, more positive interpretation 
bias, more positive valenced contrast, and higher negative mood and emotional 
vulnerability. 
b CBM training coded 1= positive training, 2= negative training.   
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Figure 1.  
Interaction plot illustrating the effects of CBM training on interpretation bias 
according to comparison style. 
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Figure 2. 
Interaction plot illustrating the effects of CBM training on valenced contrast 
according to comparison style 
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Figure 3. Interaction plot illustrating the effects of CBM training on emotional 
vulnerability according to comparison style 
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